In this appendix we describe an example, due to Nati Linial, of a function f : N N ! f0;1;2g with the property that Class(0) = Class(1) = Class(2) = 1. This example implies that 13 A possible direction for extending Theorem 11 to functions with non-Boolean range might be to generalize Lemma 10 to coloring of the two dimensional plane by more than 2 colors. However, such generalization of the lemma is not true: There are 3 colorings of the plane (say by colors 0,1,2), where Class(0) = Class(1) = Class(2) = 1. Such example was constructed by Nati Linial, and is included, with his kind permission, in the appendix. It remains open whether the corresponding generalization of Theorem 11 is true.
It can be veri ed that every diagonal point (x; x) forms a singleton equivalence class. Since for each value in f0;1;2g there are in nitely many preimages of the form (x; x), it follows that Class(0) = Class(1) = Class(2) = 1.
Each party P i locally computes y i 2 ?k;k] such that y i x i (mod 2k + 1).
The parties compute n-privately, using the protocol of 6], s k such that s k P n i=1 y i (mod 2k + 1) and s k 2 ?k;k]. The value s k is the outcome of the k-th round.
It is easy to see that no coalition (of any size t n) gets any additional information from the execution of this protocol. After a nite number of iterations (which depends on the input vector) the output s k stabilizes on the correct value. Thus, SUM n is n-private in the nonterminating model.
The next example shows that we can demand even more. Consider the following nonterminating protocol for computing GCD n : For k = 1; 2; 3; : : :
Each party P i computes y i = 1 if k j x i and y i = 0 otherwise. The parties compute, b(n ? 1)=2c-privately, the AND of the y i 's. This bit indicates whether k divides all the x i 's or not. The output of the k-th round is the maximal g k that divides all the x i 's.
The protocol computes GCD n , and it is b(n ? 1)=2c-private in the non-terminating model.
In the protocol for SUM n , no participant knows when the result stabilizes. Here, however, the gcd can never exceed x i . Thus after x i many iterations, party P i knows that he knows the nal outcome. After max n i=1 x i iterations, all the parties know that they know the nal outcome. However, the protocol must continue, since the parties do not know whether the other parties know that the result is already nal. In other words, the privacy requirements prevent the parties from achieving common knowledge 14] on the fact that the result is already nal, and an in nite execution is enforced.
Concluding Remarks
In case that a function f is not 1-private, it can still be computed by rst revealing the lengths jx i j of all participants inputs, and then using the protocols for the nite case of 8, 5]. However, f(x) can always be computed while revealing only smaller amount of additional information (for a formal de nition see 3, 4]) { the maximal input length, i.e., max n i=1 jx i j { in two steps:
Compute b(n ? 1)=2c-privately the value m = max n i=1 jx i j.
Compute b(n ? 1)=2c-privately the value of f over the nite domain of strings with length at most m. For functions with low circuit complexity, the second step can be performed e ciently using the protocols described in 5, 8, 1]. The rst step can be performed using the protocol described in the proof of theorem 2 (section 3): In the`-th round, party P i sets y i = 1 if jx i j `and y i = 0 otherwise. Then, the parties compute b(n ? 1)=2c-privately the AND of the y i 's and stop with output`if the AND is 1. This step is therefore polynomial-time in the length of the inputx. It is possible to substantially reduce the number of iterations in this part while preserving the polynomial complexity, by checking in the`-th round whether max n i=1 jx i j 2`.
Thus if the maximum is m, this fact is found in O(log m) rounds (instead of O(m) rounds).
Letx(i; j) andw(i; j) denote two inputs in f ?1 (0) whose projections on the i and j coordinates yield the above representatives (takex(i; j) =w(i; j) if there is only one equivalence class).
Let F be a 1-private protocol which computes f with "-advantage (0 < " 1 2 ). Consider runs of F on the 2 n 2 inputsx(1; 2);w(1; 2); : : : ;x(n?1; n);w(n?1; n). Let d be the minimal integer such that the probability that P i and P j exchange more then d bits, given that the input is eitherx(i; j) orw(i; j), is less than " n 2 (for all (i; j) pairs).
We modify the protocol F as follows: All parties run F until it either terminates, or some pair attempts to exchange more than d bits. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the rst such pair is (1; 2), and further thatx(1; 2);w(1; 2) 2 A 1;2 . In this case, the pair aborts the execution of F, and announces that the value of f is 1. (In case of con icting announcements in the same round, the one resulting from the minimal pair in lexicographical order is adopted by all parties). The modi ed protocol exchanges at most d n 2 bits on all inputs. We argue that it computes the correct answer with probability at least 1 2 + " 2 . Suppose, without loss of generality, that f(z) = 0. For all pairs i; j with representativesx(i; j);w(i; j) 2 A i;j , the messages exchanged between P i and P j on inputz are distributed identically to one of the two representatives, and thus the probability that more than d bits will be exchanged in F is bounded above by " n 2 .
Thus the probability that some i; j as above will abort the execution of F and announce \1"
as the nal outcome is smaller then " 2 . Any pair i; j withx(i; j);w(i; j) 2 B i;j cannot announce \1" as the nal outcome by aborting F's execution. The other source of errors stems from errors in F's nal outcome. The probability that this occurs is smaller than 6 Non-Terminating Protocols So far, we considered protocols that are required to be private, compute the correct value (with probability 1 2 + "), and terminate (with probability 1). In this section we show that if we abandon the termination condition (and the requirement that a distinguished \last message" is sent), and require instead only \correctness in the limit", then private computations which were not possible before become possible. We exemplify the model via two examples. Consider the following non-terminating protocol for computing SUM n : For k = 1; 2; 3; : : : Proof: 2 Let C; D; E be three distinct equivalence classes of B . Let (x 1 ; y 1 ); (x 2 ; y 2 ); (x 3 ; y 3 ) be arbitrary elements of C; D and E respectively (see Figure 1) . By claim 1, x i 6 = x j and y i 6 = y j for every i 6 = j ( Proof: Let f : (f0; 1g ) n ! f0;1g, and F be a 1-private protocol which computes f with "-advantage. We show that F can be modi ed to a communication protocol which computes f with " 2 -advantage while exchanging only a bounded number of bits between every pair of parties (where the bound does not depend on the input).
In order to carry out this transformation, it would be desirable to be in a situation similar to that occurring in SUM n , where everyz 2 f ?1 (0) has message distribution similar to some xed input (0 for SUM n ). While this desired situation may not occur, something weaker, but su cient for our purposes, does: For every link (P i ; P j ), there is a value v 2 f0;1g and there are at most two xed inputsx(i; j);w(i; j) 2 (f0; 1g ) n so that for everyz 2 f ?1 (v), the distribution of messages exchanged on the link (P i ; P j ), given inputz, is identical to the same distribution either given inputx(i; j) or given inputw(i; j). Let 1 i < j n. De ne the set A i;j (resp. B i;j ) by (x i ; x j ) 2 A i;j if there exists an n-tuplex = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ) extending (x i ; x j ) such that f(x) = 0 (resp. f(x) = 1). Notice that A i;j B i;j covers f0;1g f0;1g . We now relate the 1-privacy of f to the sets A i;j ; B i;j .
Suppose f(x) = f(w) = 0 and (x i ; x j ) A i;j (w i ; w j ). Any 1-private protocol which computes f induces identical distribution of messages exchanged between P i and P j , given the inputx and the inputw. (Similarly for f(x) = f(w) = 1 and (x i ; x j ) B i;j (w i ; w j ).) The proof of this claim is immediate from the de nitions of the sets A i;j ; B i;j , the relations A i;j , B i;j , A i;j and B i;j , and 1-privacy. By lemma 10, for each (i; j), at least one of the sets A i;j ; B i;j has no more than two equivalence classes in the corresponding equivalence relation. Without loss of generality A i;j has at most two equivalence classes, and let (x i ; x j ) and (w i ; w j ) be xed representatives of the two classes. (Notice that for a di erent pair i 0 ; j 0 , the set B i 0 ;j 0 can be the set with Class( ) 2.) GCD n (x) = 1. In the proof of the analogous lemma we use the following triples of n-tuples: x = ( x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ; : : : ; x n ) x 0 = ( x 1 ; 1; x 3 ; x 4 ; : : : ; x n ) 1 = ( 1; 1; 1; 1; : : : ; 1 )
Now, let PRIMES = fq 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ; : : :g denote the sequence of prime numbers. In the proof of the theorem we will construct a protocol for ID as follows: On input (a; b) (two natural numbers 1) P 1 will simulate P 1 with x 1 = q a . P 2 will simulate P 2 ; P 3 ; : : : ; P n with x 2 = x 3 = : : : = x n = q b .
Clearly, GCD n (x) = 1 if and only if a 6 = b. Thus the original argument holds here as well.
Characterization For Boolean Functions
In this section we characterize the privacy of any Boolean function f in terms of its communication complexity. Proof of Theorem 5: Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists a protocol F which computes SUM n 1-privately with "-advantage. Let = " 2 . Using Lemma 6, there exists a constant d such that for every input vectorx satisfying SUM n (x) = 0, the probability that more than d bits are transmitted during the execution of F is bounded by . We use this property of F to construct a randomized protocol A to compute the ID function over f0;1g m f0;1g m , with "=2 -advantage, using only a constant (d + 1) number of bits. This will be a contradiction to Lemma 7.
The protocol A works as following: On input (a; b) 2 f0;1g m f0;1g m , the two parties (denoted by P 1 and P 2 ) will simulate the protocol F: P 1 will simulate P 1 with x 1 = a (the integer in the range 0; 2 m ? 1] whose binary representation is the string a). P 2 will simulate P 2 ; P 3 ; : : : ; P n with x 2 = ?b and x 3 = x 4 = : : : = x n = 0. The parties P 1 and P 2 will simulate F until it either terminates, or d bits are transmitted. If F terminates with nal value 0, the parties output ID(a; b) = 1 (namely, they claim that a = b).
If F terminates with value 6 = 0, or does not terminate after exchanging d bits, then the parties output ID(a; b) = 0 (namely, they claim that a 6 = b).
Clearly, the protocol A transmits at most d+1 bits. What we now show is that A computes the value of the ID function over f0;1g m f0;1g m with probability
2 . If a = b, then the constructedx satis es SUM n (x) = 0. By Lemma 6, the probability that more than d bits are exchanged on such input is at most . The other possible source of error is an incorrect output of F. The probability that this happens is no greater than Corollary 8: Multiplication over the rationales is not 1-private. Proof: Addition over the integers can be reduced to multiplication in the cyclic group f2 i j i 2 Zg, by mapping the integer i to the rational number 2 i . Thus a 1-private protocol for multiplication over the rationales would translate into a 1-private protocol for addition over the integers, contradicting Theorem 5.
The technique relating communication complexity and privacy is applicable for various other functions. For example:
Theorem 9: Let 0 < " 1 2 and n 2. Let N denote the set of natural numbers f1;2;:::g, and GCD n : N n ! N be de ned as the greatest common divisor of the n arguments. There is no "-advantage protocol which computes GCD n 1-privately.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof for Theorem 5. We sketch here the di erences: the analogue of Lemma 6 will be proved for input vectors satisfying
The high level structure of the proof is as following: Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists an "-advantage, 1-private, protocol F which computes SUM n . Privacy arguments imply that, with high probability, the number of bits communicated by F on all inputsx which satisfy SUM n (x) = 0 is bounded. We then show how to transform F into a twoargument protocol which computes the predicate \identity" using bounded communication. This contradicts a known lower bound.
Lemma 6: Let 0 < " 1 2 and 0 < 1 be two constants. Suppose there is an "-advantage, 1-private protocol F for computing SUM n . Then there exists a constant d such that for every input vectorx with SUM n (x) = 0, the probability that fewer than d bits are transmitted during the execution of F is at least 1 ? . Proof: We rst show that for everyx with SUM n (x) = 0, the distribution of messages on every link (P i ; P j ) (i < j) of the network, when the input isx, is the same as the distribution of messages on this link, when the input is (0; 0; : : : ; 0). Then, we prove the existence of a constant d as above for the input vector (0; 0; : : : ; 0). Combining these two claims we get the proof of the lemma.
Letx be an input vector satisfying SUM n (x) = 0. To simplify the notations, we restrict attention to the link (P 1 ; P 2 ). Consider the following three input vectors: x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ; : : : ; x n ) x 0 = (x 1 ; 0; x 2 + x 3 ; x 4 ; : : : ; x n ) 0 = (0; 0; 0; 0; : : : ; 0) By the assumptions, SUM n for all three vectors is 0. By 1-privacy, the distribution of messages on the link (P 1 ; P 2 ) must be the same for the two vectorsx andx 0 . Otherwise P 1 will be able to distinguish between the two. Similarly, the distribution of messages on the link (P 1 ; P 2 ) must be equal for the two vectorsx 0 and0, as otherwise P 2 will be able to distinguish between them. Thus, the distribution of messages on the link (P 1 ; P 2 ) is equal forx and0.
In the second part of the proof, we use the termination condition for the input vector0. It implies that for each link (P i ; P j ) there exists a constant d i;j such that the probability that more then d i;j bits are exchanged over (P i ; P j ) during the execution of the protocol on0 is at most = n 2 . Letx be any input vector satisfying SUM n (x) = 0. By the rst part of the proof, the probability that more then d i;j bits are exchanged over (P i ; P j ) during the execution of the protocol onx is also bounded by = n 2 . Thus, the probability that more than d = These results imply that many \natural" functions can be computed b(n ? 1)=2c-privately.
This includes functions as addition over the positive integers, maximum, minimum, and multiplication over the integers. Note that for the minimum and maximum, f ?1 (b) is in nite for every b. However, these two functions satisfy the condition of theorem 2 and thus are b(n ? 1)=2c-private.
Finally, we remark that the above protocols satisfy a stronger de nition of privacy, as de ned in 10].
Impossibility Results
In this section we apply communication complexity arguments to prove the existence of functions that are not even 1-private. Speci cally, we show that addition over Z, the ring of integers, is not 1-private. The same result holds for integer gcd.
Theorem 5: Let 0 < " 1 2 and n 3. Let SUM n : Z n ! Z be de ned as SUM n (x) = P n i=1 x i : There is no "-advantage protocol which computes SUM n 1-privately. function f is t-private if there exists a t-private terminating protocol that computes it with "-advantage, for some 0 < " 1 2 .
We end this section with some standard communication complexity de nitions. Let f0;1g m denote the collection of binary strings whose length is at most m. The "-advantage communication complexity of f, when restricted to f0;1g m , denoted C " (f m ), is the minimum over all n-party protocols which compute f with "-advantage over f0;1g m , of the worst case communication length of the protocol, over all n-tuples of inputs that are all at most m-bit long. (Notice that party P i has input x i . This is the \regular" de nition, as in 17, 16], and should not be confused with the one of Chandra, Furst and Lipton 9].) The "-advantage communication complexity of a function f, denoted C " (f)(m), is de ned as C " (f m ). For deterministic protocols, C det (f)(m) is de ned similarly. We say that f has bounded communication complexity if there is some positive " (0 < " 1=2) and an integer d, such that for all m, C " (f)(m) d.
Functions That Can Be Privately Computed
In this section we present a su cient condition, based on C " (f), for b(n ? 1)=2c-privacy of f. This enables us to derive b(n ? 1)=2c-private error-free protocols for a wide family of \natural" functions. We start with a lemma: can be computed t-privately, using an error-free protocol, then f is t-private.
Proof: The value of f b (x), for every b 2 B, is determined by the value of f(x). Thus, to compute f(x), the parties can go over every b 2 B (say in lexicographic order) and compute f b (x) using the given t-private protocol for f b , without revealing any additional information.
The protocol terminates when for some b 2 B the value of f b (x) is 1. From the de nition of f b this implies that f(x) = b. As every function f b is computed by an error-free, t-private protocol, it is not hard to verify that the resulting protocol is error-free and is t-private.
Theorem 2: Let f : (f0; 1g ) n ! B and 0 < " The system consists of a synchronous network of n computationally unbounded parties P 1 ; P 2 ; : : : ; P n . Each pair of parties is connected by a secure (no eavesdropping) and reliable communication channel. At the beginning of an execution, each party P i has an input x i 2 f0;1g (no probability space is associated with the inputs). In addition, each party has a random input r i taken from a source of randomness R i (the random inputs are independent). The parties wish to compute the value of a function f(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ). To this end, they exchange messages as prescribed by a protocol F. The parties are honest, namely they follow the protocol F, and there are no failures of any kind. Messages are sent in rounds, where in each round every processor sends a (non-empty) message to every other processor. The protocol speci es n functions, one per party, which determine the messages sent by each party. The arguments to the messages producing function of each processor are its input, its random input, the round number, the messages it received so far, and the identity of the receiver.
The communication S sent in an execution of the protocol is the concatenation of all messages sent in the execution, parsed according to sender, receiver, and round number. For a subset T f1;2;:::;ng we denote by S T the communication S with the exception of messages sent between parties in T. The communication length of the protocol F on inputs x 1 ; : : :; x n is the maximum length of all communications S, sent in F on these inputs, over all random inputs. We say that a communication string S, parsed as above, is consistent with the protocol F, party P i and input x i if the following holds: There is a positive probability that if P i has input x i and receives the messages in the string S that are destined to it, P i will send messages identical to those messages in S that emanate from P i . (Notice that to be consistent with just one party, the communication string need not be an actual string sent in some execution.)
We say that a protocol F computes the function f with "-advantage (0 < " 1 2 ) if for every inputx = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) the last message in the protocol, is an identical message sent by party P 1 to all parties, indicating that this is the last message in the execution, and containing a value F(x;r) which satis es Prr (F(x;r) = f(x)) 1 2 + " : Denote by p k (x) the probability that more than k bits are exchanged between the parties during the execution of the protocol F with inputx (the probability space is over the random inputs of all parties). The protocol is terminating if for every inputx lim
We say that a coalition (i.e. a set of parties) T does not learn any additional information (other than what follows from its input and the function value) from the execution of a randomized protocol F, which computes f, if the following holds: For every two inputsx;ỹ 2 (f0; 1g ) n that agree in their T entries (i.e. 8i 2 T : x i = y i ) and satisfy f(x) = f(ỹ), the messages passed between T and T are identically distributed. That is, for every communication S, Prr(S T jx) = Prr(S T jỹ) ;
where the probability space is over the random inputs of all parties.
We say that a protocol F for computing f is t-private if any coalition T of at most t parties does not learn any additional information from the execution of the protocol. We say that a Chaum, Crepeau, and Damgard 8], have shown that if the domain D of f is nite, then f is b(n ? 1)=2c-private. Speci c functions, like addition, are even n-private over nite domains 6], while certain functions, like Boolean OR, are not dn=2e-private 1 5] . However, functions of interest are typically de ned not over nite domains, but rather over all strings, over the integers, or more generally over some countable domain. To apply the protocol of 5, 8], one has to (implicitly or explicitly) assume an upper bound on inputs size. If the bound does not hold then the protocol, which depends not only on f, but also on the size of the domain, has to be adjusted. This adjustment amounts to revealing additional information on the magnitude of the inputs.
The question we deal with in this work is private computations of functions de ned over countable domains. In other words, is there a private protocol for computing f which can be applied to all inputs, regardless of their sizes. Before going any further, we remark that the b(n ? 1)=2c-private protocol of 5, 8 ] cannot be used in the in nite domain. Its rst step is to apply a secret-sharing scheme to every input. Secret sharing schemes strongly rely on the niteness of the domain, and indeed do not exist over countable domains 7, 11]. We show that the privacy of f is closely related to the communication complexity of f, as de ned by Yao 17], namely to the number of bits that need to be communicated among n parties in order to compute f (using any protocol, not necessarily a private one). The connection between these two notions enables us to show that a wide class of functions are b(n ? 1)=2c-private. This class includes, among others, maximum, minimum, addition over the non-negative integers, and multiplication over all integers. The relations to communication complexity are further used in our impossibility results. For example, we show that over the (negative and non-negative) integers, addition is not even 1-private. That is, there is no protocol which computes the sum of n integers and preserves privacy even with respect to single participants.
This contrasts with the b(n ? 1)=2c-privacy of addition over the non-negative integers, and the n-privacy of addition over any nite domain.
We give a complete characterization of private Boolean functions: A Boolean function is 1-private if and only if its communication complexity is bounded. As many Boolean functions have unbounded communication complexity, this proves that there are Boolean functions which are not even 1-private. Furthermore, we show that if a Boolean f is 1-private, then it is also b(n ? 1)=2c-private. In 10] it was shown that if a Boolean f is dn=2e-private, then it is also n-private. Hence there is a three level privacy hierarchy for Boolean functions: Every Boolean function (de ned over a countable domain) is either n-private, b(n ? 1)=2c-private but not dn=2e-private, or not 1-private.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the model and give the needed de nitions. In section 3 we apply communication complexity arguments to produce private protocols for various functions. Section 4 contains the impossibility results for the functions addition and integer gcd. In section 5 we prove our characterization for the Boolean case, and its implications. Section 6 introduces a model of non-terminating protocols which compute f \in the limit", and demonstrate some intriguing private protocols in this model. Finally, section 7 contains concluding remarks and open problems.
